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On the margins of the Arab Spring 
Alice Wilson 
 
Abstract 
This article revisits the margins as a conceptual space from which to illuminate ‘the centre’, 
suggesting how the marginal is analogous to, and distinct from, the exception. This is 
explored through an examination of the Arab Spring from its margins: annexed Western 
Sahara’s uprising that narrowly preceded Tunisia’s. Although Sahrawis perceived similarities 
between their uprising and the Arab Spring, Western Sahara’s uprising is overlooked from 
most commentary on the Arab Spring. The article considers how similarities between 
Western Sahara’s and Arab Spring uprisings are obscured from view by analytical premises 
that have silencing effects. In the context of the margins, these silencing effects assume 
spectacular dimensions, the ‘disappearance’ of an uprising. Silencing effects nevertheless 
operate, less spectacularly, in ideas about the Arab Spring. 
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The time: late 2010. 
The place: North Africa. 
The scene: thousands of protestors camp out demonstrating against the government. 
 
In the light of the recent wave of demonstrations, protests and uprisings across the Arab 
world, the above scenario may sound easily recognizable. The particular protest in question, 
however, is unfamiliar to many, perhaps most, observers of and participants in the events that 
I shall refer to as the Arab Spring. For this protest took place in the Moroccan-controlled 
areas of the disputed territory Western Sahara. The demonstrations unfolded from October to 
November 2010, a few weeks before the immolation of Bou‘azizi in Tunisia on 17 December 
2010, usually taken to be the starting point of the Arab Spring. Although Sahrawis in annexed 
Western Sahara had been holding demonstrations against Morocco since 1999, this was their 
largest protest to date.1 In the weeks and months that followed, as other Arab countries went 
on to see their largest demonstrations for decades, many Sahrawis felt that they recognized 
their own grievances and aspirations in those raised by their compatriots elsewhere. The 
notion that this protest was connected to the Arab Spring was also raised by Noam Chomsky, 
who suggested in February 2011 that “the current wave of protests actually began last 
November in Western Sahara” (Democracy Now! 2011). Nevertheless, very few 
commentators have included Western Sahara’s uprising in discussions of the Arab Spring. 
Outside contexts where Western Sahara is high profile (e.g. in Spain, the former colonial 
power), many people have never heard of the uprising at all. The admittedly low levels of 
international interest in Western Sahara may not suffice to explain the readiness with which 
this protest has been overlooked. In November 2009, when Morocco deported Sahrawi 
human rights activist Aminetou Haidar to the Canary Islands, the international media took up 
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the story of one woman’s hunger strike and even US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton 
intervened. One year later, the demonstrations of an estimated 15,000-20,000 Sahrawis 
remained unknown to most non-specialists, even when the eyes of the world turned to anti-
government demonstrations in North Africa.  
 
Annexed Western Sahara’s 2010 uprising took place on the temporal, geographical and, it 
would seem, conceptual margins of the Arab Spring. Examining this uprising, this article thus 
explores the Arab Spring from its margins. I ask what might make Sahrawis’ claims of 
similarities between their uprising and Arab Spring uprisings plausible. To clarify, I do not 
address whether Western Sahara might have ‘begun’ the Arab Spring. There is no evidence 
that Tunisians, Egyptians and others took inspiration from Sahrawis, as protestors did from 
Tunisians and Egyptians. The absence of a causal relationship, though, does not preclude the 
existence of other sorts of relationships, the possibilities for which I explore below. If other 
connections can be made (and, it seems, have been by Sahrawis), I go on to ask what might 
prevent these connections from being noticed, in other words what might make annexed 
Western Sahara’s uprising so readily overlooked from discussions of the Arab Spring. I do 
not address the question of what makes one outcome of the Arab Spring different from 
another. This question has been widely and helpfully addressed elsewhere, through attention 
to the decisive role played by national armies (Hazran 2012), the responses of national 
governing elites (Matthiesen 2013), external intervention to support or undermine a regime 
facing protests, the significance of monarchical versus republican government (Yom and 
Gause III 2012) and the impact of each nation’s historical trajectory on appetite and 
possibilities for reform (Joffé 2013). Rather than asking about different outcomes of protests, 
such as what factors made an (attempted) uprising short-lived, e.g. for Oman (Worrall 2012), 
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or what made one uprising fail to bring down a government where others succeeded (cf 
Bahrain), here I consider the distinct question of inclusion and exclusion. I consider what 
might explain that a whole uprising comes to be, both for most participants in, and 
commentators on, the Arab Spring, overlooked altogether. 
 
Addressing these questions is not merely relevant to those concerned with Western Sahara. 
To examine Western Sahara’s 2010 uprising in relation to the Arab Spring is to examine the 
latter from its margins. The margins and marginality, with their potential for partial visibility, 
have been studied in multiple senses for their possibilities for illuminating, such as through 
their presumed resistance to, or creativeness as regards, the centre.2 The margins may make 
“the implicit explicit” (Green 2005: 1). In this sense, engagement with the margin has been 
analogous to that with the exception, also fruitfully studied to bring more closely into focus 
that which might otherwise be overlooked about the non-exceptional (Schmitt 1985; 
Agamben 1998; Navaro-Yashin 2012). If there is a relationship of analogy between them, the 
margins are, however, not the same as the exception. Whilst the visibility of the exception is 
often assured, that of the margins is uncertain. Whereas the exception is that which is 
included by virtue of its exclusion (Agamben 1998), at the margins–where it is “not 
necessarily clear exactly where you are or where you are from” (Green 2005: 1)–the line 
between inclusion and exclusion is unclear. It cannot be taken for granted whether the 
marginal case belongs or not to the broader category on the margins of which it lies. I shall 
explore how the blurred line between inclusion and exclusion makes the margins of the Arab 
Spring a setting for the magnification of dynamics at work, more subtly, in the construction 
of the Arab Spring. 
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I contextualize my discussion of Western Sahara’s 2010 uprising by drawing on my 
ethnographic fieldwork with Sahrawis. The geography of the Western Sahara conflict hinges 
upon a distinction between annexed and exiled spaces and populations. I conducted fieldwork 
with Sahrawi refugees in Algeria both before and after the 2010 uprising.3 In 2012 I also 
carried out a short field trip in annexed Western Sahara.4 My contact with annexed Sahrawis 
pre-dates 2012, extending to encounters with annexed Sahrawis who were visiting the 
refugee camps. 
 
On the margins: Western Sahara 
In north-west Africa, between Morocco and Mauritania lies the disputed territory of Western 
Sahara. Its marginality, like that of north-west Greece, is “continually reconstructed while 
somehow staying the same” (Green 2005: 1). Inhabited by speakers of the Hassaniya dialect 
of Arabic, Western Sahara is part of the hassanophone north-west Sahara which forms the 
westernmost margins of the Arab world. In pre-colonial times, the north-west Sahara fell 
outside neighbouring centres of state power: the Moroccan sultanate to the north, and the 
Malian and Songhay empires to the south. Later, what became Western Sahara constituted 
the margins of European colonialism. Spain established its claim to the territory in 1884. But 
it was one of the last areas of North Africa to be ‘pacified’, in 1934. In the post-colonial age, 
Western Sahara has found itself on the margins of decolonization. The UN called for 
decolonization for the Spanish Sahara from the 1960s, and the International Court of Justice’s 
Advisory Opinion of 1975 found in favour of the right to self-determination of the people of 
Western Sahara (International Court of Justice 1975). Nevertheless, instead of decolonizing, 
in 1975 Spain handed over the territory to be divided between Morocco and Mauritania. The 
latter jointly annexed the territory; Mauritania’s withdrawal in 1979 left Morocco partially 
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annexing the territory. Western Sahara’s liberation movement, Polisario Front, founded in 
1973 to contest Spanish colonialism, fought Morocco (and, initially, Mauritania) for the 
territory. Their clash initially took the form of war, and later, as of 1991, UN negotiations and 
other diplomatic forums. In the nearly forty years since Spain, the colonial power, left, 
decolonization has still not been achieved for Western Sahara. The UN yearly renews its 
mission for a referendum (on self-determination) in Western Sahara (Minurso). But, with 
Morocco and Polisario in deadlock as to who would have the right to vote, and whether 
voters would be allowed to choose between options including independence, the Western 
Sahara conflict is trapped in political stalemate. As the UN’s last case of a non self-governing 
territory in Africa, it finds itself at the margins of the reach of decolonization. The failure, 
despite a clear mandate, of the implementation of decolonization might even suggest that the 
territory is at the margins of the enforcement of international law–declared but not applied, an 
unclear line indeed between inclusion and exclusion.5 
 
The conflict has produced a political entity that occupies the margins of ideas about statehood 
in international law and political theory. After Spain’s final withdrawal from the territory, on 
27 February 1976 Polisario founded the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). SADR 
has gone on to be recognized as a state by a number of states and the African Union.6 Both 
SADR and Morocco claim, in theory, all of Western Sahara. In practice, Polisario controls 
about a quarter of Western Sahara. Morocco controls the rest, and built a military wall in the 
1980s to divide the two areas. SADR’s institutions are based not in Polisario-controlled 
Western Sahara, however, but in exile in desert refugee camps in Algeria. From 1975 
thousands of Sahrawis fled the annexation, and from early 1976 they were settled in refugee 
camps near the Algerian military base and town, Tindouf, some 50km from the border with 
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Western Sahara. A fusion of SADR and Polisario, state authority and liberation movement, 
governs this exiled population. With Algeria having delegated authority over the camps and 
the refugees to Polisario, the fusion of SADR and Polisario is able to engage in many of the 
activities of other state authorities. It has its own constitution, Parliament, law codes and 
prisons. In sum, SADR is based in exile and, in fusion with Polisario structures, governs only 
a part of its claimed population and territory. But it enjoys some inter-state and multi-lateral 
recognition, and engages in a wide range of governance activities. It thus blurs policy and 
theoretical boundaries between state and non-state.  
 
As Green (2005) observes, marginality is constructed and reconstructed in particular 
contexts. Sahrawis are aware that their annexation and exile are construed as marginal from 
the perspective of international political agendas in North Africa. But this dual predicament is 
not of marginal concern for Sahrawis themselves. It has refashioned their lives in both 
mundane and extraordinary ways. The conflict has produced a refugee case that, after the 
Palestinians, is the world’s longest-running. These refugees, who may have numbered some 
165,000 by the 2000s, live in an unforgiving climate in challenging conditions of material 
shortage in the camps near Tindouf.7 Sahrawis living in Moroccan-controlled Western 
Sahara, who may outnumber the exiles, have recently been described as living in a “state of 
fear” (Robert F. Kennedy International Delegation 2012). They live side by side with a 
Moroccan settler population, believed to outnumber the Sahrawi population there, and a 
heavy Moroccan military presence.8 Since 1999, many annexed Sahrawis have participated in 
demonstrations against Morocco’s annexation. Since 2005, this resistance has coalesced into 
what nationalist Sahrawis call their own Intifada (Mundy 2006). Sahrawi nationalist activism 
has met with repression from the Moroccan authorities (Human Rights Watch 2008; United 
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Nations Committee against Torture 2011; Human Rights Watch 2012). In this context of 
annexed Sahrawis’ ongoing resistance to Moroccan rule over Western Sahara, in 2010 
annexed Sahrawis demonstrated on an unprecedented scale.  
 
Filling the desert 
On 9 October 2010, a small group of Sahrawi protestors in annexed Western Sahara began a 
demonstration. They did not demonstrate in the capital, El Aaiun, though. They went out into 
the open desert some 15 kilometres away, and set up tents at a place known as Gdeim Izik. 
As more demonstrators joined them, the desert began to fill with tents. The UN estimates that 
the number of tents at Gdeim Izik grew to 6,610, accommodating “over 15,000” 
demonstrators (United Nations Security Council 2011: 1). Other sources estimate that the 
number of protestors reached some 20,000 by 8 November (Verdier 2010). Access to the 
protests for the media and outside observers was highly constrained by the Moroccan 
authorities (cf The Guardian 2010). Morocco resisted the access to the protest camps of 
monitors from the UN Mission on the grounds that “the Mission should not interact directly 
with the population on what was described as a purely internal and social matter” (United 
Nations Security Council 2011: 1). There was therefore scant opportunity for monitoring or 
reporting on the protests. Media coverage from the time emphasized the protestors’ concerns 
about economic issues, such as “living conditions” (BBC 2010). When, on 24 October, 
Moroccan security forces shot and killed a 14 year old boy who was trying to join the 
encampment, one account in the French media reported on the killing under a title focusing 
not on the boy’s death, but on the perceived underlying economic cause of the 
demonstration–namely that annexed Sahrawis were jealous of the subsidies that Morocco 
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offered to refugees who left the refugee camps in Algeria to come and live under Moroccan 
rule (Radio France Internationale 2010).  
 
Things came to a head on the morning of 8 November. Claiming that the camps had been 
taken over by political activists, Moroccan security forces moved in to break up the protest 
camps: “Moroccan auxiliary forces and police officers forcefully dispersed the protesters and 
destroyed the camp using tear gas, water cannons, batons and loudspeakers mounted on 
vehicles and helicopters. There is no evidence that live ammunition or other lethal means 
were used” (United Nations Security Council 2011). In the clash, both sides claimed fatal 
casualties, eleven on the side of the Moroccans, and four on the side of the Sahrawis. After 
the dismantling of Gdeim Izik, further violence ensued in the city of El Aauin, where it was 
reported that Sahrawis attacked public and private property, and Moroccan settlers attacked 
Sahrawi private property (United Nations Security Council 2011). When I visited El Aaiun in 
April 2012, Sahrawis pointed out to me a building that had been gutted by fire in the riots, 
and as yet remained unrenovated. Sahrawi protestors also tore down Moroccan flags and 
images of the king, and displayed SADR flags (Sahara Thawra 2012).  
 
In the light of the lack of an independent inquiry, and the paucity of international press 
access, many unanswered questions remain about Gdeim Izik and its ending. From various 
quarters, including the European press (BBC 2010; Radio France Internationale 2010), the 
Moroccan press (Bennani 2011), and the accounts of Sahrawis narrated to a BBC journalist 
(Lewis 2011), a narrative has converged that the protests focused on economic demands for 
housing and jobs. This view was endorsed by the Moroccan authorities in its claims to UN 
monitors that the protest was a “purely internal and social matter”. There is reportedly cause 
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for Sahrawis to harbour perceptions that they suffer from economic wrongs in annexed 
Western Sahara. Whilst Morocco claims to have brought prosperity to the areas of Western 
Sahara which it controls, Sahrawis are reportedly discriminated against in their access to jobs, 
housing and even education (Shelley 2004). In fieldwork with exiled Sahrawis in Algeria 
between 2007 and 2012, I met Sahrawis, usually young men, who had arrived in recent 
months from the Moroccan-controlled areas of Western Sahara. They sought better 
educational or even work opportunities than those available to them in the annexed areas. 
They complained of having suffered discrimination there, such as not being allowed to speak 
Hassaniya in schools. Some sought to study abroad through the SADR Ministry of Education 
programmes for high school and university study abroad. Others settled in the refugee camps 
and began working there, either for the Polisario administration or in the informal private 
sector. At the same time as annexed Sahrawis report perceptions and experiences of 
inadequate economic opportunities in the annexed areas, one of the policies of Moroccan 
annexation has been to encourage thousands of Moroccan settlers to move into the region, 
encouraged by higher salaries and tax breaks (Shelley 2004). Thus the benefits of Morocco’s 
claimed era of prosperity in Western Sahara may not necessarily reach Sahrawis–a matter to 
which I return below.  
 
Another dimension to Sahrawis’ complaints about access to housing and jobs in Moroccan-
controlled Western Sahara has elicited concern in both the Moroccan and French press 
(Bennani 2010; Radio France Internationale 2010; Bennani 2011). In addition to there being 
Sahrawis in the Moroccan-controlled areas who have been there since before the annexation, 
there are Sahrawis who moved there after annexation. They fall into two groups, both 
receiving housing and maintenance payments from the Moroccan state. There are persons 
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brought by Morocco into the territory in the early 1990s in order to be registered for a UN 
referendum on self-determination. They are known by the term Al Wahda (the union). Many 
of them were not recognized by the UN as Sahrawis eligible to vote in a self-determination 
referendum (Zunes and Mundy 2010: 214). Initially brought in temporarily, they have 
remained to the present. They still receive monthly maintenance and food rations from the 
state. Most, it would seem, have now been moved from makeshift tents into houses given by 
the state (Bennani 2011). The second group are those who have been welcomed as ‘returners’ 
from the Tindouf refugee camps. These ‘aidīn (Arabic) [returners] or ralliés (French) [those 
won over] also receive a house and monthly maintenance allowance, to the tune of 1250 
dirhams (115 euros) in the late 2000s (Bennani 2010; Soudan 2010). For the Moroccan and 
French press, it is ‘indigenous’ Sahrawis’ jealousy of these subsidies that caused them to go 
out on protest at Gdeim Izik (Radio France Internationale 2010; Bennani 2011).   
 
There is a widespread willingness, then, not absent from Sahrawi protesters (cf Lewis 2011), 
to present the Gdeim Izik protest as focusing on economic demands for jobs and housing. 
There is furthermore evidence that annexed Sahrawis perceive themselves to be marginalized 
from Morocco’s claims to have brought prosperity to Western Sahara. Nevertheless, neither 
the narrative that Gdeim Izik was about ‘economic’ concerns, nor supporting evidence that 
Sahrawis perceive themselves to be economically marginalized in annexed Western Sahara, 
necessarily suffices to sustain a thesis that ‘economic issues’ alone underpinned Gdeim Izik 
in particular, or protests raising economic demands more broadly. Such a thesis must be 
interrogated empirically and conceptually. Let us first assess empirically the specific thesis 
that annexed Sahrawis’ jealousy of rallies’ subsidies caused the Gdeim Izik protests. This 
thesis would seem to draw strength from the fact that a boom in ralliés numbers was reported 
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in early 2010 (Bennani 2010; Filali-Ansary 2010; Soudan 2010). In 2011, Sahrawi refugees 
also recalled this period as a time when ralliés numbers grew. They were able to name more 
cases to me of ralliés from amongst their own connections. They also recalled seeing more 
ralliés–sometimes personal acquaintances–on Moroccan television, which can be watched 
from the refugee camps. Had annexed Sahrawis been disturbed by ralliés’ access to 
Moroccan subsidies, then a boom in ralliés might indeed have fuelled tension in the annexed 
areas. Yet, despite claims in the Moroccan and European media to that effect, it is not clear 
from Sahrawi accounts that ralliés’ subsidies cause jealousy amongst other Sahrawis. None 
of the annexed Sahrawis whom I met in either the camps or Moroccan-controlled Western 
Sahara professed to such envy. Interlocutors from both exiled and annexed populations 
indicated to me that there are other subsidies from the Moroccan state available for annexed 
Sahrawis and Moroccan settlers. The existence of these subsidies reportedly dates back to the 
period before Gdeim Izik. This problematizes the notion that economic tensions arising from 
subsidy jealousy could explain the outbreak of the uprising. The abundance of subsidies in 
annexed Western Sahara, for both Sahrawis and Moroccans, also raises the possibility that 
the effects of the global economic crisis on livelihoods may have been less severe here than 
elsewhere in the Arab world. This may make a general worsening of economic conditions 
less likely a trigger for the Gdeim Izik protests than has been suggested may be the case for 
other protests in the Arab world (and elsewhere) in 2010 and 2011. An alternative 
explanation for the trigger of Gdeim Izik at that particular historical moment was offered by 
exiled Sahrawis. They believed that the intensified influx of ralliés, many of whom were 
jobless youths, contributed to Gdeim Izik, but for another reason. These youths, refugees 
claimed, were accustomed to being able to express dissent in exile to Polisario. Once in 
Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara, exiled Sahrawis opined, the youths’ willingness to 
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voice dissent took them to the forefront of opposition to the Moroccan state and to Gdeim 
Izik. Exiled and annexed Sahrawis jointly reported that after Gdeim Izik, the Moroccan 
authorities discontinued granting a house to an unaccompanied rallié, reserving houses only 
for family groups. Following this change in policy, the numbers of new ralliés dropped back 
from the high levels of early 2010.9 The extent to which ralliés played a part in either 
provoking or organizing Gdeim Izik needs further research. Nevertheless, given the range of 
subsidies available to Sahrawis and Moroccans in annexed Western Sahara, it is questionable 
that Gdeim Izik can be attributed to subsidy jealousy amongst Sahrawis. 
 
It might be argued that the wider question remains of whether Sahrawis’ general economic 
marginalization under Moroccan rule was the cause of Gdeim Izik. This thesis is likewise 
problematic. Drawing on an intellectual tradition embracing Karl Marx, Rosa Luxembourg 
and Karl Polanyi, Maha Abdelrahman (2012: 615) asserts that the opposition between 
economic and political struggles is “falsely conceived”. Rather, “the economic and the 
political are inseparable without necessarily being fixed in a static, causal relationship” 
(Abdelrahman 2012: 621). She proposes that in the Egyptian revolution, an anti-revolutionary 
coalition is seeking to promote the notion of a distinction between economic and political 
demands, in order to suggest that the former are extraneous, and even threatening to, the 
revolution. In so doing, she suggests, the anti-revolutionaries hope to reduce the revolution in 
Egypt to a question of transition to liberal democracy, leaving unaddressed questions of 
redistribution and social justice. In other words, the attempted separation of the ‘political’ 
from the ‘economic’ so as to reduce protests to one or the other is, in itself, a politicized and 
politicizing agenda. Accounts of protests in Western Sahara that stress their ‘merely’ 
economic content are doubly problematic, then. They gloss over not only the connections 
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between the economic and political, but also the political agenda advanced by this omission. 
As concerns annexed Western Sahara, the Moroccan government presents protests there as 
economic in order to depoliticize them (Shelley 2004: 102, 110). Morocco thereby seeks to 
disassociate protests from the question of the unresolved self-determination of the people of 
Western Sahara. 
 
Video footage of Gdeim Izik gatherings indicates that the dimensions of the protest included, 
but were not limited to, demands made of the Moroccan government for jobs and homes.  
(Sahara Thawra 2010; Sahara Thawra 2012). The footage emphasizes the political 
dimensions of the protests, and the links between their economic and political dimensions. 
Protesters can be seen and heard chanting slogans such as “Ahel essahra daau daau 
welkhairāt illa yenbā‘u” [The Sahrawi people suffers whilst its wealth is looted] (Sahara 
Thawra 2010).10 Sahrawi nationalists have long raised objections that annexed Western 
Sahara’s natural resources, especially phosphate and fish, are exploited to the greater benefit 
of Moroccans, and not sufficiently to that of Sahrawis. Protesters are also depicted using pro 
self-determination slogans used in the Tindouf camps, such as “Sahrawi sahrawia aidi fi 
aidak lil huria” [Sahrawi men and women join hands for freedom]. The riots in El Aaiun 
seem to have taken on an overtly political character, with the Moroccan flag being torn down 
and the SADR flag raised (Sahara Thawra 2012). It is not only Sahrawis’ accounts of Gdeim 
Izik that stress its political aspects. The very manner of Morocco’s closing the protest down 
indicates its conviction, despite its claims to the contrary, that more than ‘social’ issues were 
at stake. 
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In questioning the helpfulness of seeing Gdeim Izik as ‘economic’, I do not seek its ‘over-
politicization’, as if it were ‘purely’ a political uprising against Morocco. Rather, I suggest re-
asserting the links between the political and economic in the demands raised at Gdeim Izik. 
These links, once recognized, may help us understand why, once protests spread across the 
Arab world in the following weeks and months, Sahrawis voiced convictions that their own 
protests resonated with those of their compatriots.  
 
Seen and unseen 
In phone calls and emails with Sahrawis as the Arab Spring progressed, and then in meetings 
with annexed and exiled Sahrawis in 2011 and 2012, Sahrawi interlocutors were anxious to 
press upon me that they too had had their Arab Spring protest–in fact, some held, “the first”. 
The authors of the online documentary film about Gdeim Izik even claimed the latter as the 
“detonator of the Arab Spring” (Sahara Thawra 2012). The attractions of this narrative for 
Sahrawis, seeking visibility for their unresolved case of self-determination, are clear. Yet, 
beyond such attractions, and eschewing the question of a causal relationship between Gdeim 
Izik and the uprisings that followed, might there be plausible grounds for connections 
between Gdeim Izik and Arab Spring uprisings? The content and local context of Gdeim Izik 
suggest striking similarities with Arab Spring protests. First, the protest expressed popular 
conviction of both economic and political injustices, with protestors aware of the links 
between them. This resonates with other Arab Spring uprisings (cf Abdelrahman 2012). 
Secondly, Gdeim Izik followed on from a history of protests in the annexed areas, going back 
to at least 1999 (Shelley 2004: 82), even as it transcended them in scale and urgency. The 
uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt also drew on longstanding protest movements that preceded 
them (Ayeb 2011; Joya 2011). Third, the protestors expressed demands for political values 
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and ideals such as freedom and karāma [dignity]. In the online documentary, a protestor from 
Gdeim Izik talks of how the protest gave the Sahrawi people a sense of their dignity (Sahara 
Thawra 2012). The Sahrawi self-determination movement dubbed Gdeim Izik the camps of 
karāma [dignity], as quickly as 7 December 2010, before events in Tunisia in December 2010 
(Cherkaoui 2010). Freedom and dignity are amongst the values that Arab Spring protestors 
across the region have been demanding and celebrating. Fourth, the demonstrators, in 
aligning themselves with the self-determination movement, were subscribing to a political 
movement demanding the use of democratic means, a referendum, to appoint an alternative 
political system to one perceived to be illegitimate and oppressive. Thus, like Arab Spring 
uprisings driven by a popular demand for an alternative, elected government, Gdeim Izik 
protestors endorsed demands for democratic participation. The demonstrations began in non-
violent form, in line with the non-violent means employed throughout the ‘Sahrawi Intifada’ 
(Mundy 2006). The first casualty, the 14 year old boy killed on 24 October 2010, died at the 
hands of the Moroccan security forces. Only after Morocco forcefully broke up the camps did 
the protest turn violent, with claims of casualties on both sides. Fifth, the manner in which the 
outbreak was dealt with confirms the authoritarian character of the state authority in question. 
 
Considered from the perspective of protestors’ actions, and Moroccan and Sahrawi reactions, 
there are strong similarities between Gdeim Izik and Arab Spring uprisings: the expression of 
dissent at perceived oppressive economic and authoritarian political conditions; the economic 
being consciously identified as related to and perpetuated by the political; and political values 
such as freedom, dignity and–ultimately–democratic deliberation being celebrated or 
advocated. In addition, the timing of Gdeim Izik was very similar to uprisings elsewhere. In 
the light of these similarities, Gdeim Izik’s under-recognition amongst external observers as a 
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protest in discussions of the Arab Spring, becomes even more intriguing. What makes–or 
could appear to make–Western Sahara different? Is it only a question of timing, of Gdeim 
Izik falling a few weeks too early for recognition as part of the Arab Spring, or are other 
factors at work? 
 
Perhaps what might most readily make Gdeim Izik seem to belong to a category apart from 
the Arab Spring is that this uprising against a particular state authority (Morocco) took place 
in a setting that does not fit the conventional nation-state model. Although Morocco considers 
Western Sahara to be an integral part of its national territory, Western Sahara is technically a 
non self-governing territory awaiting self-determination. Currently, no other state formally 
endorses Morocco’s claims to the territory. The fact that the protest in Western Sahara is 
linked to a self-determination case, and not a straightforward nation-state setting, facilitates 
its ‘de-categorization’ from Arab Spring protests. In other cases, protestors were perceived to 
be seeking the downfall or reform of a national government within a national territory.11 The 
Gdeim Izik protestors were not seeking the fall of the Moroccan regime per se. They were, 
however, expressing views in line with a desire for the Moroccan state to fall from its 
perceived position (for those demonstrating) as usurper of Sahrawi sovereignty. In other 
words, this protest demanded an end to oppressive rule, potentially through democratic, and, 
at least initially, through non-violent means. But the setting cannot be reduced to a nation-
state framework of oppressed nation deposing authoritarian regime. The absence of a critical 
approach to the accident of nation-state boundaries, especially in post-colonial settings, can 
distort scholarship and policy (cf Ferguson 2007). Such an effect of distortion may be at play 
in preventing external observers from recognizing the anti-authoritarian and pro-democratic 
aspects of Western Sahara’s 2010 uprising. 
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Another factor contributing to the overlooking of Gdeim Izik for analysts of the Arab Spring 
is surely the small absolute numbers of the population in Western Sahara and its biggest ever 
protest, when compared to other protests and the populations to which protestors belong. A 
protest of 20,000 people is small compared to Egypt’s Tahrir Square. Whilst population 
figures for Sahrawis are notoriously imprecise, if we take as a guideline the UN figures for 
the total adult Sahrawi population in annexed Western Sahara in 2000, which was found to be 
41,150 (Zunes and Mundy 2010: 214), then a population of 20,000 people some ten years 
later is, proportionally, perhaps one of the largest protests of the Arab world in recent years.  
 
A third factor might be the unusual setting of this protest: in makeshift camps in the desert. 
Unlike some of the iconic spaces taken over in Arab Spring uprisings, such as urban centres 
or the most famous national public space, annexed Sahrawis did not take over El Aaiun’s 
public square, Place du Méchouar. They occupied a non-urban space removed from the 
centre of Moroccan state power in annexed Western Sahara. Urban spaces have long been 
associated with state power both in Western and some Middle Eastern and North African 
traditions of state power. Nonetheless, other forms of state(-like) or state-capturing power in 
the Middle East and North Africa have been recognized as arising from distinctly non-urban 
contexts (cf Ibn Khaldūn 1958; Sneath 2007). More specifically, urban spaces have received 
special attention in the study of the construction of a democratic public sphere, from the 
Athenian polis to the Habermasian coffee house. In discussing how Yemeni qat chews might 
provide an alternative sphere for a critical public, however, Wedeen (2007) does not suggest 
that chews more fully fulfil that in urban rather than rural settings. Middle Eastern and North 
African qualifications to the notion that urban spaces are privileged in the constitution of state 
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power and democratic publics have perhaps not gone far, though, to dislodge a predisposition 
towards the presumption of such links amongst the media, policy and intellectual circles that 
have sought to define the Arab Spring. In a context of presumed connections between urban 
space, state power and democratic publics, the annexed Sahrawis’ desert protest may seem an 
unlikely candidate as a regime-challenging uprising. Nevertheless, from a Sahrawi nationalist 
perspective, there is symbolic and practical reason to stage resistance in a non-urban desert 
space. Sahrawi nationalism draws its very raison d’être from the claim that Moroccan state 
power in the form of the urban-based makhzan (tax-extracting state power) was not sovereign 
in what is now Western Sahara. Sahrawi nationalists’ self-perception is that they have 
resisted both Spanish colonialism and perceived Moroccan colonialism. These are the two 
powers which respectively introduced and developed urban spaces in Western Sahara. The 
rejection of urban space, in local context, therefore resonates with resistance towards 
(perceived) colonial power. This connection is particularly strong as concerns Morocco, 
which, for over thirty years, has developed urban space in Western Sahara as a sign of its rule 
there. The local symbolic potency of a non-urban desert environment for staging protests is 
reinforced by the fact that Sahrawi nationalists’ associate the desert with their perceived 
mobile pastoralist heritage. In other words, the desert is a ‘Sahrawi’ space. Finally, the desert 
offered practical advantages for staging a protest, so as to avoid Moroccan reprisals for as 
long as possible. In this specific context, then, a desert protest may have been more effective 
and locally inspiring than an urban protest.    
 
A fourth factor that cannot be overlooked is the general condition of Western Sahara being 
under-reported as a conflict zone and scene of alleged human rights abuses committed by 
Moroccan authorities against self-determination activists. Whilst NGOs publish reports on 
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the situation of human rights in both Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara and the Tindouf 
refugee camps (Human Rights Watch 2008; Human Rights Watch 2012), the report on 
Western Sahara of the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) (2006) was not published by that office. Alleged to have recommended “adequate 
and continuous” human rights monitoring in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara and the 
Tindouf refugee camps, the report was only made available to Morocco, Algeria and 
Polisario. The Office’s subsequent failure to proceed to general publication is believed by 
some to be the result of Moroccan pressure opposing such publication. Despite the fact that 
the UN mission to Western Sahara is one of the few UN missions with peace-keeping duties 
to exclude human rights monitoring, and despite the OHCHR recommendation in favour of 
human rights monitoring there, such monitoring has as yet never been included in the 
Minurso mandate. Its proposed inclusion is opposed at each renewal of the Minurso mandate 
by members of the Security Council (for instance by France in April 2012). What is more, a 
pre-released version of the Secretary General’s 2012 report to the Security Council on 
Western Sahara was later edited to produce a final report that was less critical of Morocco 
(What's in Blue 2012). The tendency to overlook Moroccan violations of international norms 
with regards to Western Sahara, including human rights, is reproduced at the highest levels of 
the UN. This background, whereby the full weight of human rights monitoring is consistently 
withheld from Western Sahara, only makes it all the more likely that the uprising in Gdeim 
Izik be overlooked. 
 
If Gdeim Izik has similarities and differences compared to Arab Spring uprisings elsewhere, 
this in itself does not distinguish it from other protests. What may prove distinguishing in the 
case of Gdeim Izik are the circumstances under which those similarities and differences 
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become either visible or invisible. The content and local context of the Gdeim Izik brings to 
light similarities with the Arab Spring. Yet expectations of a nation-state unit, attention to 
absolute rather than relative numbers, a reluctance to recognize the non-sedentary as a 
political space, and a willingness to overlook human rights violations committed by a state 
authority with powerful international allies, obscure the similarities from sight. The validity 
of these expectations and assumptions is questionable. They rest on naturalization (of the 
nation-state), ahistorical conceptions (of politically significant spaces and populations), and 
complicity in perpetuating violations. Unquestioned, these premises make Gdeim Izik’s 
connections to Arab Spring uprisings invisible. More than Moroccan repression, the world’s 
indifference to Western Sahara, and the timing of falling a few weeks before Tunisia’s 
uprising, such premises have surely been the most effective in silencing Gdeim Izik. On the 
margins of the Arab Spring, the silencing effects of naturalization, ahistoricism and 
complicity make a whole uprising seemingly disappear.  
 
Silencing effects 
After analyzing the construction of Western Sahara’s marginality, I discussed how annexed 
Western Sahara’s largest uprising to date, Gdeim Izik, which took place just weeks before 
Tunisia’s revolution, has both similarities and differences with Arab Spring uprisings 
elsewhere. Asking not whether Gdeim Izik ‘launched’ the Arab Spring, but whether it bore 
similarities to uprisings elsewhere in terms of longings for liberation from government 
perceived as politically and economically oppressive, and demands for freedom, dignity and 
democratic participation, I argued that attention to the Gdeim Izik protest itself, and its local 
context, highlighted similarities in these very areas. If anything may justify a notion of  an 
‘Arab Spring’, despite the divergent histories and outcomes from protest to protest, it is 
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surely common concerns for liberation from oppression, and longings for freedom and 
dignity–concerns embraced by Sahrawis and Arab Spring protestors.  If very few 
commentators have considered Gdeim Izik as part of the Arab Spring, and most people 
(outside circles concerned with Western Sahara) have not heard of Gdeim Izik at all, I 
suggested that this was most fully explained not by the few weeks that separate Gdeim Izik 
from Tunisia’s uprising, but through the silencing effects of naturalization (of the nation-
state), ahistoricism (in conceptualizing politically significant populations and spaces), and 
complicity (in the perpetuation of violations). The silencing effects of these premises made 
Gdeim Izik the uprising that ‘disappeared’. This predicament may bring to mind that of other 
Arab Spring uprisings that were short-lived or repressed forcefully. Yet the predicament of 
annexed Western Sahara’s uprising is an extreme case. The uprising became ‘unseeable’ 
altogether. Here lies the wider interest of analyzing Western Sahara’s relationship to the Arab 
Spring. Marginal with regard to the Arab Spring, and situated on the unclear line between 
inclusion and exclusion, Gdeim Izik is an extreme case where the silencing effects of 
naturalization, ahistoricism and complicity manifest themselves at their most dramatic: the 
‘disappearance’ of an uprising. At the margins, silencing effects are thrown into relief. Yet 
these effects may operate, albeit with less spectacle, beyond the margins, in the very 
conceptualization of the ‘Arab Spring’.  
 
Naturalization and ahistoricism played a part in setting the scene for the Arab Spring. There 
has been a tendency to naturalize the Middle East and North Africa as a region immune to 
democratization. This naturalization has rested on the thesis of ‘Arab Exceptionalism’, the 
notion that Arab countries were allegedly able to experience economic modernization and 
liberalization without pursuing political liberalization and democratization. There have been 
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many criticisms of this thesis (e.g. Diamond 2010), and its underlying implications of an 
assumed connection between political and economic liberalization (e.g. Elyachar 2005). In 
particular, the thesis that there is a propensity in the Arab world towards authoritarianism 
rests on an ahistorical view that ignores the extent to which the appetite and possibilities for 
political change are historically situated (Joffé 2013). The naturalization of the Middle East 
and North Africa as a region predisposed towards authoritarianism, and the ahistoricism 
thereby entailed, has had its own silencing effects. It discounted historical context from 
analyses of contemporary political circumstances. It hid from attention the extent to which 
Arab publics were not exceptional, but expressed in polls an appetite for democracy 
(Diamond 2010: 95), and found an ‘appetite’ for restricting freedoms when fearing political 
insecurity. The principle of the latter trade-off is by no means unfamiliar to the citizens of 
‘liberal’ regimes. The naturalization of an ahistoricized Arab world as authoritarian was 
compounded through a situation of complicity: that of the external regimes that were content 
to uphold authoritarian Arab governments. The latter survived and flourished with 
considerable help from external allies. This help included political backing and technical 
support for security agencies, and extended to, in the case of non oil-rich states, aid supplies 
which functioned, like oil for rich authoritarian regimes, to minimize the government’s 
accountability to its populace (Diamond 2010). This complicity had its own silencing effect. 
It deflected attention from the responsibility for ‘Arab Exceptionalism’ beyond the Arab 
world. Naturalization, ahistoricism, complicity and their silencing effects permeate the 
context underpinning, and thus the construction of, the Arab Spring. On its margins, a place 
of partial visibility where the line between inclusion and exclusion is blurred, the silencing 
effects of these premises were thrown into relief. They could assume their most spectacular 
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proportions, a ‘disappearance’. Somewhat ironically, this made acutely visible forms of 
silencing that have sometimes resisted exposure at the centre. 
 
Beyond questions of Western Sahara and the Arab Spring, my argument revisits the 
importance of the margins as a conceptual space. I suggested that the margins are analogous 
to, yet distinct from, the exception, in that where the exception is included by virtue of 
exclusion, at the margins the line between inclusion and exclusion is blurred. This quality 
makes the margins vulnerable to invisibility. Yet the very spectacle of disappearance can 
foreground visibility, and an illuminating relationship to the categories through which the 
marginal is generated.  
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1 ‘Sahrawi’ is a contested term (cf Zunes and Mundy 2010: 92-95); I shall follow the 
common usage of people from Western Sahara in referring to them as Sahrawis.   
2 For a critical review of marginality, see Green 2005. 
3 From January 2007 to January 2009 I conducted two years of fieldwork with Sahrawi 
refugees. I also conducted fieldwork with Sahrawi refugees in shorter trips of a few weeks in 
2006, 2011 and 2012. 
4 Political circumstances in the annexed areas explain the short length of my fieldwork in 
Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara.  
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5 On the history of and conflict in Western Sahara, see Hodges 1983, Shelley 2004 and Zunes 
and Mundy 2010. 
6 For a list, as at 2006, of 80 recognitions of SADR by other states, including 22 cancellations 
or suspensions, see Pazzanita, 2006: 376-378. 
7 There are no transparently compiled population figures for any Sahrawi population. 
Controversy surrounds the size of the Sahrawi population in the various locations where a 
Sahrawi community can be found. As regards the exiled population in the camps, UNHCR 
estimates of the refugee population in the 2000s suggested some 165,000 refugees. As Chatty 
et al. (2010: 41) discuss, this figure can only be taken as an estimate. 
8 Extrapolating from the UN list from 2000 of approved Sahrawi adult voters for a potential 
referendum on self-determination (Zunes and Mundy 2010: 214), the annexed Sahrawi 
population may be bigger than the exiled Sahrawi population (41,150 and 33,998 voters 
found respectively). The Moroccan settled population in Western Sahara is estimated at some 
300,000, and the number of members of the Moroccan armed forces stationed in Western 
Sahara estimated at 100,000 (Arieff 2012: 7). 
9 The boom in ralliés may have been related to the economic crisis in Europe, as the low 
prospects for refugees of finding a job in Europe may have encouraged young men to look 
elsewhere for lucrative migration strategies. 
10 All transliterations reflect pronunciation in Hassaniya rather than classical Arabic. All 
translations are mine, unless otherwise stated. 
11 Although perceived as national uprisings addressing national governments, some Arab 
Spring uprisings occurred in contexts where there is a history of a region questioning the 
legitimacy of the rule of national government there–cf Oman and Dhofar (see Worrall 2012) 
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and Yemen and southern Yemen (on the Southern Movement in Yemen, see Dahlgren 2008). 
Western Sahara’s situation is at least formally distinct from these cases in that it has the status 
of a non self-governing territory, and is not currently recognized as part of Morocco by any 
state other than Morocco.  
